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IN THE SUPREME CCU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER W . .JACOBSON, SANDRA WIL-
LLUIS and BRENT T. LYNCH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-V8.--
SL\1 E lcAND BOARD OF THE STATE OF 
l T~ Tl. C. R. HENDERSON, M. V. HATCH, 
WALTER G. MANN, EDWARD W. CLYDE 
a11d C W. THOMSON, as members of the 
Sld I,, L;,nd Board of the State of Utah; 
H'.J\l\E J. ALLEN, Director of the State 
Land Board of the State of Utah; ALBERT 
C. MASSA, LESLIE B. TOMLEY, BEN K. 
LERER, HARRY EDISON, LOUIS B. MAY-
ER, UPHEAVAL DOME OIL CORPORA-
T JON. BEN.JAMIN H. SWIG, ARWIN E. 
OR~.ISBY, ROOSEVELT - LEE - MAGEE, 
LTD .. EDW).RD L. HEUCK, RANDOLPH 
A HEARS't'. H. C. MeAULEY VIRGINIA 
C. WOLDEN, RALPH LOWE, FORREST B. 
MILLER, PETRO-A'TLAS CORPORATION, 
SHELL OIL COMP ANY, a corporation, 
. .\LTA LJND(,2UIST, C .S. WATTS, BER-
~ARD C. McGUIRE, FRANCIS M. RAY-
1\lOND, EL PASO NATURAL GAS PROD-
UCTS COMPANY a corporation, and W. 
G. I.A SRI CH, ' 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RTAT'EMI~N'l1 O"B~ FACTS 
Case 
No. 9401 
'l'liP abnv\' action was commenced by plaintiffs to 
1hpiire the Staie Land Board, its commissioners and 
d.in•c-tor tu tak<> over the management and control of 
lea:-;ing of lan(ls as provided by the laws of the State of 
Utah. A description of the lands is set forth in the com-
plaint (R. l-G). 
2 
~rhe case was submith•d to the Distrirt Court 011 , 
stipulation of faets (R. 46). 
. It is admitted that title to some of the lands dmriher] 
m the complaint vested in the Htate prior to the renew:il 
of the Federal lea:;;es <'OYering said lands (H. G!J, Si). 111 
fact, the District Con rt in its finding No. 9 statPrl that 
with four of the Federal ]eases title to the lands w~terl 
in the State prior to the request for the five year ex 
tension being made to the Bureau of Land l\f anagemen! 
Under the stipulation of facts plaintiffs filed in ti1f 
State Land Office certain applications for mineral~, lwin~ 
the oil and gas ]eases set out in I1Jxhihit I attacherl tr: 
the stipulation (R. 54-55). 
It is further admitted that at the bme of filing !Ill' 
respective applications hy plaintiffs, each plaintiff ira' 
a citizen of the United States, qualified to filP applicil· 
tions for oil and gas leases with the State of Utah anri 
to take oil and gas leases from the State of Utah. It!~ 
further stipulated that the applications filed by plaintiffr 
for oil and gas leases from the State of Utah were on 
the form and in the manner prescribed h~' the State Lano 
Board of Utah (R. 47). 
The applications of plaintiffs were refused by tht 
State Land Board for the reason that the application' 
covered land in conflict with U.S. Oil and Gas Leases, 
even though title to the land had passed to the State oi 
Utah under the provisions of Public Law No. 340, pass~ 
April 22 1954 and Public Law No. 699, passed July 1L 
' . ·t· pon the 
1956. The State Land Board took this pos1 ion u 
3 
ndYll'e nf flw Atlorne~· Ucueral of the State of Utah as 
:'li<J\n1 by K'd1iliit ~ attarhed to the stipulation (R. 56-67 
iw.) and tliP ll!inutr•s of the 11weting of the Utah State 
Lalld Board nf .fannary G, 1958 and January 7, 1958 
I !S .. :', H. ()~). 
Tli<· partiPs defendant, other than the State Land 
r;uanl. 1b eornmissionern and director, were parties 
11nrned in thP leases issued by the United States Govern-
1;11·1; 1 '" ,, (', ing the lands described in the complaint prior 
to title 1Jassing to the State of Utah (R. 48). 
The lPssees of the United States Government leases 
r( qnc;-;tPd the five >rear extension of such leases from the 
\ ' 11ih·cl ~tatPs Government and not the State of Utah 
nft .. 1· tit!<> to the lands had passed to the State of Utah 
m. -t!l;. 
The Bureau of Land 1\fanagement has accepted ren-
tal:.; from ihe lc:-;sees with the exception of those rentals 
that Wt~re paid to the State of utah after the bureau had 
ren<ler<•tl a deeision advising the lessees that title had 
wsted in the Stat<> and directed the lessees to pay the 
l'Pntal to the State of Utah. The Bureau of Land Manage-
ment has Pither accounted to and paid to the State or 
H'rognized its obligation to account to and paid the 
State thr proportion of the rentals which accrued after 
tltp vesting· o[' title in the State. The payment was made 
in ptoportion to tlw relative acreage the Government and 
t!ip ~tat0 owned (R. 49). vVith the exception of lands 
that had been withdrawn pursuant to executive orders, 
the only rPason given for the refusal to grant State leases 
4 
is based upon tlH• opinion of tl1e Attorney UenPral 
11
• 
the State of rtali <lafrd D('('f'lllhPl' -l- 1957 (R r:)(' "O '. 
, IL • ~ ) ·J"" 11\I• I 
The Dis tr id Court entPred its order and <lPrr~p i\i. 
nying the rPlief prayed for in tlie <'Omplaint, <fomi:-:,111c 
plaintiff's' eomplaint and giving the re:·qwdivp defendani' 
judg-ment for their eosts in<'nrr<'d. 
ST ArrK~fl1JKT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE UNITED ST A'TES IS NOT AN INDISPENS-
ABLE PARTY. 
POINT II 
THE ST ATE BECAME THE OWNER OF THE PRO-
PERTY WHEN THE SURVEYS WERE MADE AND 
ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT. 
POINT III 
AFTER THE ST ATE BECAME THE OWNER OF 
THE PROPERTY, IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE 
LAND BOARD TO TAKE COMPLETE CONTROL 
OF THE LEASING OF THE LANDS AT THE EX-
PIRATION OF THE ORIGINAL ·TERM OF THE 
FEDERAL LEASES. 
ARG1TM~NT 
POINT I 
THE UNITED ST A'TES IS NOT AN INDISPENS-
ABLE PARTY. 
This is an action for a writ to require the 8tate Lailll 
Board, its commissioners and director to take charge of. 
manage and lease lands over which the State of Utali 
had title. The action does not try title nor the rights o! 
any of the parties interested in the respective lease.
1 
The lessees under the Federal leases were made partieslll 
11 ,.,,Jan'" \lith tla~ prineiple set forth jn the cases of 
;/ 1·111 s \'. J:11rkc1. ,')() l'talt :21, UP. 2d 577 (.July, 1932) 
,1 ltil'li :-:t;1tc:-: a:-: fol lo\\:-:: 
"'l'e<'lrni('ally tht• only nece::;sary parties to 
1tut11rl:t1n11.-' prof·(•eding.-; arP tlie plaintiff who as-
:-:' ! t" ( ]ip rigi1t to hav(-_• the act done and the de-
i't:'Tllimit 11po11 \\°110111 rest:-; the duty of perfor-
111m1<·1., Ho\Y<·ver, tlie practiee is usual and proper 
t() hrillg in all parties or other persons who are 
lialilt> to he affeeted by the judgment, in order 
that tlwy may have opportunity to be heard in 
tlH·ir o\rn lwhalf. 3 Bancroft, Code Practice & 
BPltlPdies, 51US; 18 R.C.L. 330." 
<1nd 111//u,1 TJrus. illotor Cr1. Ys. Dislrict Court, 82 Utah 
')-.) -)- ., •) l -()- ((.) ·t Jl)')'.)) ,J1 _. _,) l . _1, ;), ;) (' • •. 0.J . 
Tl1e Comt in cliscu:-;sing indispensable or necessary 
1•all1Pc in tile case of /·,'tone v. Srt!t L(;kc Cd,1;, 11 Ptah 2d 
1 %, :i:-iri I'. :!d (;;q ( N oY. H)(iO) :-;tated: 
"Ln eonsidering whether the granting of the 
lllotion t<i dismiss the Church from the second 
<·ausp of aetion was proper, it is to be borne in 
mind that one should be regarded as a necessary 
party to a lnw suit if he has rights or interests 
iunJ!ved in the subject matter in such a way that 
his presence is essential to a full, fair and equit-
ab]p deterrnination of his rights and those of other 
parties to the suit." 
ln tltc· «as<~ of 81Jrinv v. Ohio Oil Co., 108 F. 2d 560 
( ~; ('j L rn-rn)' thP Conrt held: 
· 'ln an action between private inilividuals 
asserting elaims to the same land, under titles 
rlPrived from the state, the state is not a necessary 
6 
party. Roxana Petroleum Corp. v. Colquitt D (' 
34 F. 2d 470, affirmed, 5 Cir., 49 F. 2d 1025.:, · .. 
In the case of South K anias Irr. Co. v. Provo Rirrr 
W.ater Users' Assn., 10 Utah 2d 225, 350 P. 2d 851 (Apr. 
1960) the Court held: 
. "If a useful purpose will be served by litiga 
hon between two parties, the fact that it wou!ri 
be more effective if an additional party could be 
joined does not mean that the third party is in. 
dispensable. Here, however, this suit can haw 
no direct effect as between the parties withollt 
joining the United States. The judgment whirl1 
plaintiffs seek against the defendant could not be 
enforced against it without enforcing it against 
the United States, for it cannot use the tunnel 
without the enforced consent of the United 
States." 
In the case of Utilitves Production Corporation v. 
Carter Oil Co., 72 F. 2d 655 (10 Cir. Aug. 1934) it if 
stated: 
"While there is some lack of unifonnity in 
nomenclature, the rules as to parties are well 
settled. A party is 'indispensable' if a dec'.ee 
cannot be entered without injuriously affect~g 
his rights, or leaving the controversy in ~situation 
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. An 
indispensable party should either be joined nr 
the case dismissed.'~ 
The District Court in this action could have passed 
upon the question of the duty of the Land Board, its 
commissioners and director to take charge of, manage 
and lease lands over which the State of Utah had become 
-
' 
1-,;-;i<'d witl1 title without in any way affecting any interest 
of the l "nittid States. 
POINT II 
THE ST A TE BECAME THE OWNER OF THE PRO-
PERTY WHEN THE SURVEYS WERE MADE AND 
ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT. 
F nder tl1e F,nabling Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 
WI Cc·ngre::-;s granted to the State of Utah in aid of 
cnt11111on :-;cl10ols Sections 2, 16, 32 and 36 in each township 
of tlw public domain. 
T n the ease of U. 8. v. Sweet, 245 U. S. 563 38 S. Ct. 
J 93, G'.2 L. Ed 473, the Supreme Court of the United States 
helct thai the lands granted did not extend to lands which 
were known to be mineral in character at the time title 
wonlci have otherwise vested in the State of Utah The 
Act of .January 25, 1927, as amended by the Act of May 
2, UJ:l~, 43 U.S.{;.A. 870-871 extended the grant of school 
sections to States to include lands mineral in character, 
however lands rovered by leases, permits or applications 
therefor were excluded. U. 8. Code Congressional Ad-
111iHistrative Ncu-s, 84th Congress, 1956, pages 3111-3113. 
vVhat is known as the First Dawson Bill, 43 U.S.C.A. 
Scdions 870-871, extended the grant of school sections to 
State:' to embrace lands, mineral in character, even 
tllfJllgh thP same might be covered by mineral leases, and 
}ifovided that the State should become the lessor of that 
portion covered by the grant. This act was passed April 
22, 1954 and provided that an outstanding lease on a 
numbPred mineral section shall not prevent the grant of 
the section to the State and that any numbered mineral 
s 
section which would have passed to the State, exeept for 
the presence of an outstanding ]ease, shall be granted to 
that State. There seems to lw no question hnt tlwi 
Congress intende<l by this act to include hoth rniMrai 
and non-mineral land. r-. 1.c'{ Code Crmgn's.,·io11rr1 /1rlmi,
1
, 
strative Netcs, supra. To clarify this situation, Congre,, 
on July 11, 195G, amended the act, wliieh a<'t is knoirna~ 
the Second Dawson Act, so as to do awa!· with any 111 j, 
understanding and expressl~· provided that titlP to th. 
state attach to non-mineral lands as \\·ell as rninN~i 
lands. 43 F.8. Code Annotated, 870-871. 
Under the stipulation of facts, there is no qne8tion 
but that four of the parcels of land set forth in plaintiff" 
complaint title passt>d to the f:ltate nnder the Art of Jul: 
11, 1956 before any appliea ti on was made for an ex 
tension of these leases and after the priman· five year 
term had expired. These leasPS are r-07~12 (R. 82). 
U-05660 and U-05661 ( R. SG), U -OCi7:30 ( R. SGA). In tl11~ 
connection, a letter addressed to the plaintiff Sandr:i 
Williams dated January 20, 1958 states: 
"Sandra \Villi ams 
817 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Madam: 
* * * * 
Title to the above passed to the State of Ut~ 
under the provisions of Public Law 340, Apr 
22, 1954 and Public Law 699, July 11, 1956. 
The Attorney General of the State o~ yt~~ 
in an opinion dated Dec. 4, 1957, ruled t a 
9 
fin"' t>ar t-xtem;ion of time granted by the United 
State:-; on t lwse leases is valid and should be re-
f'op;ni:.wd hy the 8tate of Utah. This action was 
takPn h.Y tllP State l_Jand Board and your applica-
tions wen• reje<'ted as noted above. 
Tlie rental payments which you submitted with 
your applications will be refunded in the near 
future. 
Yours very truly, 
Frank J. Allen 
DIRECTOR'' 
Where we may have some question of dispute as to 
whether non-111inern1 land pat-med to the State of Utah 
before the ,Art of .July 11, 1956, there is no question in 
r<'gard to the last fonr rnentioned parcels. By the Act, 
the Statp not onl.'- became the lessor in place of the 
Govrrnrnent. tmt also lwcarne owner of said property. 
POINT III 
AFTER THE ST ATE BECAME THE OWNER OF 
THE PROPERTY, IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE 
LAND BOARD TO TAKE COMPLETE CONTROL 
OF THE LEASING OF THE LANDS AT THE EX-
PIRATION OF THE ORIGINAL 'TERM OF THE 
FEDERAL LEASES. 
It hecanw the duty of the Land Board, its members 
anrl diredor to take charge of the supervision, manage-
HH~nt, h>a:-<ing and control of all lands to which title had 
vrsted in tlie ~Hate of Utah. 
Arti<"le XX of the Constitutvon of Utah provides: 
''AU lands of the State that have been, or may 
10 
hereafter be granted to the State by Con"re<-· 
and all lands acquired by gift, grant or elev,~~ 
from any person or corporation, or that mar 
otherwise be acquired, are herby accepted, an;l 
declared to be the public lands of the State; aud 
shall be held in trust for the people to be disposeil 
of as may be provided by law, for the respediw 
purposes for which they have been or may be 
granted, donated, devised or otherwise aeqni1:erl." 
65-1-14, Utah Code Annotated 1!153, as arnendPrL prn 
vides: 
"The state land board shall have the direction, 
management and control of all lands heretoforr 
or hereafter granted to this state by the Unitrd 
States government, or others~ * * * ." 
65-1-24, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, pr11-
vides: 
"The board shall cause all public lands now 
owned by the state, or lands the title to whirh 
may hereafter be vested in the state, to be class-
ified and registered and thereafter sold or leased . . . . ,, 
Section 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act, as amcrnlc1l. 
30 U.S.C.A. 226-1 (a), provides: 
Upon the expiration of the initial five-year 
term of any noncompetitive lease maintained rn 
accordance with applicable statutory requirement~ 
and regulations, the record titleholder thereof 
shall be entitled to a single extension of the lease, 
unless then otherwise provided by law, for s~ch 
lands covered by it as are not on the expiration 
date of the lease withdrawn from leasing under 
this section . . . . . No withdrawal shall be eff ec-
11 
tivi· within the meaning of this section until nine.ty 
daYs after notice thereof shall be sent by reg1s-
tei:ed mail, to eaeh lessee to be affected by such 
"-itbdnnrnl. (Italies ours). 
Tl!e Da\Y;.;011 Acts Jipretofon~ referred to vested title 
in tlie State or I :tah prior to tlie request for the extension 
(\i fit(" fom ka3es heretofore mentioned. 
,\Jt1·r title passed to the State, Section 17 of the 
~I ineral Leasing Act would not control. The controlling 
nrovision \\-ould be 30 U.S.C.A., Section 189, which pro-
' 
vides as follows: 
.. rrhe ~ecretary of the Interior is authorized 
to pr0serihe necessary and proper rules and regu-
latiom; and to do any and all things necessary to 
<'arry <iut and accomplish the purposes of sections 
l81-l94, 201, 202-208, 211-214, 223-229, 241, 251, 
and 261-263 of this title, also to fix and determine 
tlte boun<lary lines of any structure, or oil or gas 
field, for the purposes thereof. Nothing in said 
sections shall be construed or held to affect the 
rights of the States or other local authority to 
Pxrrcise any rights which they may have, including 
the right to levy and collect taxes upon improve-
rnenb, ontput of mines, or other rights, property, 
or assets of any lessee of the United States. Feb. 
25, 1920, c. 85, Sec. 32, 41 Stat. 450." 
The provision just quoted covers Section 226 au-
tl10rizin<r the e -t ,· f 1 l h . . . ' , ' ,.., - ,x ens10n o eases un ess ot erwise pro-
rnlerl by law, and as stated in Section 189 it has been 
otherwise provided by law in relation to the rights of 
:-itRh-'S. 
By the letter addressed to Sandra vVilliams dated 
' 
J ,, 
January 20, 1958, heretofore ref erred to, it is appartnt 
that the Land Board did not exercise ib' diticretion Ulli\ 
judgment in denying her applications listPd in 8aicl lettP> 
It merely stated that the five year extension of time 
granted by the United States is valid and should Ii!· 
recognized by the State of Ftah. In otlwr \rords, il ltP]d 
that it had no jurisdiction to question the renewal~. 
This Court has helcl that mandanrns pl'O('l"l'd111:' 
are the proper proceedings to compel an inferior eonrt, 
commission or board to t>xerci:~·H" jurisdietion 1r1H'n snrl1 
court, commission or hoard has enoneonsl~· failed to ait 
for want of jurisdiction. In the case of Herzog Y. Brr11;1rl 
82 Utah 216, 23 P. 2d 343 ( .T nne, 1933), the Court statPti 
''\Vhen an inferionr court or trihnnal, Lavin.' 
jurisdiction, erroneously rules it is without juris 
diction, and for such reason refuses to hear or 
proceed with a cause and dismisses it, mandamus 
is the proper remedy to compel the court to re· 
instate the cause, assume jurisdiction, and pro· 
ceed with it. We have held that several times. 
Harris v. Barker, Judge (Utah) 12 P. (2d) 57!; 
Richards v. District Court of Weber County, il 
Utah, 473, 267 P. 779; Hale v. Barker, Judge, 
70 Utah, 284, 259 P. 928; Hanson v. Iverson. 
Judge, 61 Utah, 172, 211 P. 682; Ketchum Coal 
Co. v. District Court of Carbon County, 48 Utah, 
342, 159_ P .. 737, 4 A. L. R. 619; Silver ~City M~~~" 
Co. v. D1str'lct Court of Utah County, 51 Utah, .i ,. 
195 P. 194; State v. Hart, Judge, 19 ~t~h, .43~, o; 
P. 415. That, too, is the rule in other JUflSdJcbrr· 
Floyd v. Sixth Judicial Dist., 36 Nev. 349, 13 .' 
922 923 4 A L R 646 where numerous authon· ' ' · · · ' . · ·a that: ties are ref erred to, and where it 1s sa1 
13 
·\\'Ii ti(' 1 t Hrn v Le said that in cases of this char-
aetP r thP Jov.:er <'Ourt had jurisdiction to grant or 
<lenY a motion to dismiss, nevertheless that court 
<'onid not refm;e to hear a matter upon its merits 
wl1rn it was regularly before it for that purpose, 
nor eould it <livest itself of jurisdiction by an 
erroneous order any more than it could assume 
.inris<hction hy arbitrarily saying that it had the 
right to proceed.' " 
CONCLU8ION 
In <'Oll('lnsion we respectfully submit that the District 
C'omt t rrPd in making its Finding of Fact No. 13, which 
i-tated in substance that the State Land Board of Utah 
ha:;; not refusPd to exercise jurisdiction as to those of the 
snhiert lands, title to which has been acquired by the 
StatP. 'rhe trial (·ourt erred in making its Conclusions 
of Law 2 to 12 inclusive, and its Decree denying the writ 
pra!ced for, or any other or affirmative relief, dismissing 
plaintiffs' complaint and entering judgment against the 
plaintiffs for eosts incurred by the respective defendants. 
The judgmrnt appealed from should be reversed and the 
lower court instrneted to proceed as prayed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
